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t lfiHliE IDIUJKIE lAC~OSSIE CASIE 
What came to be lmown as the "Duke Lacrosse Case" began with a 
student party and a false accusation ofrape.1 On March 14, 2006, a woman 
claimed that she had been sexually assaulted at the party. A Sexual Assault 
Nurse Examiner (SANE) at Duke Hospital Emergency Room obtained cheek 
scrapings, oral swabs, vaginal swabs, ·rectal swabs, and pubic hair combings. 
The nurse also collected a pair of white panties and other items of clothing. 
On March 16, 2006, the Durham police executed a search wanant at the res-
idence of three lacrosse players, the location of the party. More evidence 
was collected, including false fingemails in a trash can in the bathroom where 
the rape allegedly occtmed. 
Five days later, the prosecutors obtained a Nontestimonial Identification 
Order (NT0)2 to compel the players to be photographed and to provide DNA 
reference samples. The next day, all forty-six Caucasian members of the 
team complied with the order by providing cheek (buccal) swabs. The play-
ers did not contest the order. Indeed, they believed that DNA testing would 
exonerate them. "We have nothing to hide," was how one of the players, 
Kyle Dowd, summed it up. 3 Their attomey agreed, although he "thought 
that the order might well be unconstitutional. " 4 Another lawyer, who was 
not representing anyone in the case, told a reporter: "I can't imagine a sce-
nario where this would be reasonable to do . . . so early in the investigation. 
*Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Westem Reserve University. This colmru1 is based in part on P. Giannelli & E. Im-
winkelried, Scientific Evidence (4th ed. 2007). Reprinted with peimission. 
1 See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & K.C. JoHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITI-
CAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE 
CAsE (2007): DoN YAEGER & MIKE PRESSLER, IT's NoT ABOUT THE TRUTH (2007); 
Robert P. Mosteller, The Duke Lacrosse Case, Innocence, and False Identifications: 
A Fundamental Failure to "Do Justice", 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1337 (2007); Robert 
P. Mosteller, Excu!patmy Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike 
Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discove1y, 15 GEO. MASON L. 
REv. 257 (2008). 
2 N.C. GEN. STAT.§§ 15A-271 to 15A-282 (2005) (authorizing such orders). 
3 TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 60. 
4 TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 59. 
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It seemsunusual, it seems overbroad, and it seems frightening that they're 
invading the privacy of so many people.' '5 
The use of North Carolina's Nontestimonial Identification statute is an 
aspect of the case that has been generally overlooked. Only a handful of 
jurisdictions have comparable provisions.6 This article examines the legal 
basis for these provisions. 
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT 
The phrase ''nontestimonial order'' derives from Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence; the privilege against self-incrimination is limited to testimonial 
statements and does not extend to physical evidence.7 The leading case on 
the applicability of the privilege to the collection of physical evidence is 
Schmerber v. California. 8 While being treated at a hospital for injuries 
sustained in an automobile collision, Schrnerber was arrested for driving 
under the influence of alcohol. At the direction of the investigating police of-
ficer, a physician obtained a blood sample from Schmerber. Although the de-
fendant objected to this procedure on the advice of counsel, his blood was 
extracted and analyzed for alcoholic content. Before the Supreme Court, 
Schmerber argued that the extraction of blood violated the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Rejecting this argument, the Court held that the privilege 
covers only communicative or testimonial evidence, not physical or real 
evidence. According to the Court: 
It is clear that the protection of the privilege reaches an accused's com-
munications, whatever form they might take .... On the other hand, 
both federal and state courts have usually held that it offers no protection 
against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or 
measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to 
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture. The 
distinction which has emerged, often expressed in different ways, is that 
the privilege is a bar against compelling "communications" or "testimony," 
but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of "real 
or physical evidence" does not violate it. 
The Court cited Justice Holmes' opinion in Holt v. United States, 9 in which 
compelled modeling of a blouse found at the crime scene was held to be 
outside the scope of the privilege: "[T]he prohibition of compelling a man 
in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use 
of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an 
exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material.'' 
5 TAYLOR & JoHNSON, supra note 1, at 57. 
6 See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J.lMwiNKELRIED, SciENTIFlc EviDENCE 
§ 2.04[a][2) (4th ed. 2007) (identifying nine states). 
7 See generally CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE cb. 15 (4th ed. 2000). 
8 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 763-64, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
908 (1966). 
9 Holt v. U.S., 218 U.S. 245,252-53, 31 S. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021 (1910). 
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases reaffinned the testimonial-physical ev-
idence distinction recognized in Schmerber. In United States v. Wade, 10 the 
Comi held that compelling an accused to exhibit his person for observation 
dming a lineup was compulsion ''to exhibit his physical characteristics, not 
compulsion to disclose any lmowledge he might have'' and thus not pro-
scribed by the privilege. In Gilbert v. California, 11 the Court concluded that 
the compelled production of a ''mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to 
the content of what is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifYing 
physical characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment's] protection." 
Similarly, in United States v. Dionisio/2 the Court mled that compelling 
defendants to speak for the purpose of voice analysis did not violate the Fifth 
Amendment because the "voice recordings were to be used solely to mea-
sure the physical properties of the witnesses' voices, not for the testimonial 
or communicative content ofwhat was to be said." 
The Court's last decision on the topic, Pennsylvania v. J11zmiz/ 3 involved 
evidence of sluned speech and lack of muscular coordination revealed by an 
arrestee during sobriety tests at a traffic stop.1·l A police officer asked Muniz 
to perfonn a horizontal gaze nystagmus test, a wallc-and-turn test, and a one-
leg-stand test. A videotape of his performance was shown at trial. The 
Supreme Court wrote: 
Under SchmerbeT and its progeny, ... any slurring of speech and other 
evidence of lack of muscular coordination revealed by Muniz's responses 
to Officer Hosterman's direct questions constitute nontestimoniai 
components of those responses. Requiring a suspect to reveal the physical 
manner in which he articulates words, like requiring him to reveal the 
physical properties of the sound produced by his voice, see Dionisio ... , 
does not, without more, compel him to provide a "testimonial" response 
for purposes of the privilege.15 
Under Schmerber and its progeny, obtaining evidence for most forensic 
10 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,222, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967). 
11 Gilbert v. Califomia, 388 U.S. 263,266-67,87 S. Ct. 1951,18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 
(1967). Accord U. S. v. Euge, 1980-1 C.B. 310, 444 U.S. 707, 718, 100 S. Ct. 87,!, 
63 L. Ed. 2d 141,80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9222,45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-757 (1980) 
("Compulsion of handwriting exemplars ... [not] testimonial evidence protected 
by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination"); U.S. v. Mara, 410 
U.S. 19, 22, 93 S. Ct. 774,35 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1973) (handwriting exemplars). 
12 U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7, 93 S. Ct. 764,35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973). 
13 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528 
(1990). 
14 A traffic stop by itself does not amount to custody under lv!iranda. Therefore, 
incriminating statements made to the police before arrest are admissible. Berkemer 
v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984). Such state-
ments are testimonial, but without custody there is no "compulsion" within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Miranda warnings are not required. 
For example, Muniz's verbal admissions during the roadside dexterity tests were 
admissible. 496 U.S. at 588 n.3. 
15 496 U.S. at 592. The Court also held that routine booking questions fell outside 
the protection of the Fifth l1Jilendment. Muniz was asked his name, address, height, 
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techniques is free from Fifth Amendment concerns because these techniques 
involve physical, not testimonial, evidence.16 Thus, the lower courts have ap-
plied Schmerber to cases involving handwriting exemplars/7 fingerprints/8 
voice exemplars, 19 dental impressions, 20 urine samples, 21 sobriety tests, 22 
weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. Four justices believed that these 
routine booking questions were not testimonial. Four other justices disagreed but 
believed routine booking questions fell within an exception to the Fifth Amendment. 
Muniz's inability to answer when he was requested to state the date of his sixth 
birthday, however, amounted to a testimonial response and should have been 
excluded. 496 U.S. at 586. See also Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201,210, 108 S. Ct. 234I, 
IOI L. Ed. 2d I84, 88-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9545, 25 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 632, 
62 A.F.T.R.2d 88-5744 (I988) ("[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused's com-
munication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a fachml assertion or disclose 
information."). 
16 A suspect's refusal to submit to a nontestimonial identification procedure may 
result in a contempt citation. See U.S. v. Rudy, 429 F.2d 993, 994 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(handwriting samples); U.S. v. Hammond, 4I9 F.2d I66, I68 (4th Cir. I969) 
(lineup); U.S. v. Doe, 405 F.2d 436, 438-39 (2d Cir. I968) (handwriting exemplar). 
17 E.g., Matter of Special Federal Grand Jury Empanelled Oct. 3I, 1985, 809 F.2d 
I 023, 1027-28, 22 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 591 (3d Cir. 1987) (requiring backhand slant 
exemplars); U.S. v. Richardson, 755 F.2d 685, 685-86 (8th Cir. I985); U.S. v. 
Shively, 715 F.2d 260, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1983); U.S. v. Greene, 722 F. Supp. 1221, 
1223 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
18 E.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46, 26 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1258 (2d Cir. 1988); 
U.S. v. Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 562, 5 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 614 (1st Cir. I979); Ap-
peal of Maguire, 571 F.2d 675,677 (1st Cir. 1978) (ordering use of reasonable force 
to compel fingerprinting);State v. Taylor, 422 So. 2d 109, 116 (La. 1982); State v. 
Burch, 490 So. 2d 552, 554 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986) (fingerprinting defendant in 
open court before the judge is permissible). 
19 E.g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d 922, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 39 (5th Cir. 
I 993) (live voice exemplar in presence of jury); U.S. v. Delaplane, 778 F.2d 570, 
575, 19 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1347 (lOth Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 
Hellmann, 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 1985); U.S. v. Williams, 704 F.2d 315, 320, 
12 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1327 (6th Cir. 1983) (live voice exemplar in presence of 
jury); Fuller v. State, 858 S.W.2d 528, 531-32 (Tex. App. Eastland 1993), petition 
for discretionary review refused, (Oct. 20, I993) (requiring defendant to repeat 
words used by assailant for the purpose of voice identification does not violate state 
constitution); State v. Hubanks, 173 Wis. 2d I, 496 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. I992) 
(defendant's refusal to provide in-court voice exemplar of specific words was a 
proper subject of jury instruction concerning such refusal). But see U.S. v. Olvera, 
30 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring defendant to speak in the presence of 
jury the words uttered during a robbery violated due process under the facts of this 
case). 
20 E.g., U.S. v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1989) (examination of teeth); 
U.S. v. Holland, 378 F. Supp. I44, 154 (E.D. Pa. I974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1053 (3d 
Cir. I974) and aff'd, 506 F.2d 1050 (3d Cir. 1974); State v. Evans, 44 Conn. App. 
307, 689 A.2d 494, 501 (1997) (''[B]ecause the order to display one's teeth, whether 
prior to or at trial, does not involve communications or testimony, the defendant's 
claim is not of constitutional magnitude .... ''); Brewer v. State, 725 So. 2d I 06, 
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gunshot residues,23 hair samples,24 and other techniques. 25 Recent cases have 
focused on DNA samples for databases.26 
Although the privilege against self-incrimination does not preclude the 
use of nontestimonial orders, such procedures raise important search and 
seizure issues. There are two potential Fomih A.mendment concerns present 
when physical evidence is obtained from a suspect for the purpose of DNA 
analysis. First, there may be a "seizure" of the person, which brings the 
suspect under the control of the police. Second, there is the subsequent search 
and seizure ofbiological specimens from that suspect. The second issue will 
be addressed first. 
130 (Miss. 1998) ("[T]he trial court's admission ofthe dental impression into evi-
dence was proper as the impression was nothing more than evidence identifying a 
physical characteristic-very similar to fingerprints .... "). 
21 E.g., U.S. v. Edmo, 140 F.3d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Being required to 
comply with Officer Boone's request for a urine sample did not deprive Edmo of his 
Fifth Amendment privilege .... "); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (1Oth 
Cir. 1 994) (" [U]rine san1ples used for drug testing constitute nontesti1nonia] evi-
dence and therefore do not implicate Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.''). 
22 E.g., State v. Theriault, 144 Ariz. 166, 696 P.2d 718, 719 (Ct. App. Div. 2 
1984) (field sobriety test); People v. Saturday, 135 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 90 Ill. Dec. 
841, 482 N.E.2d 1124 (2d Dist. 1985); State v. Beeland, 487 So. 2d 703 (La. Ct. 
App. 5th Cir. 1986); Com. v. Hayes, 544 Pa. 46,674 A.2d 677 (1996) (field sob1iety 
tests-horizontal gaze nystagmus test, walk-and-tum test, heal-to-toe test, and one-
leg-stand test-do not fall within state constitutional privilege); State v. Roadifer, 
346 N.W.2d 438, 440 (S.D. 1984) (dexterity test); State v. Maze, 16 Kan. App. 2d 
527, 825 P .2d 1169, 1173 (1992) ("recitation of the alphabet is not testimonial"). 
23 E.g., State v. Ulrich, 187 Mont. 347, 609 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980) (overruled 
by, State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252, 307 Mont. 139, 36 P.3d 900 (2001)) (GSR 
swabbings); Com. v. Monahan, 378 Pa. Super. 623,549 A.2d 231,235 (1988) (GSR 
swabbings). 
2
.j E.g., U.S. v. Dougall, 919 F.2d 932,935 (5th Cir. 1990); U.S. v. Ingram, 797 F. 
Supp. 705, 707 (E.D. Ark. 1992). 
25 E.g., People v. Thomas, 180 Cal. App. 3d 47,225 Cal. Rptr. 277,279 (5th Dist. 
1986) (saliva, hair, and blood); State v. Edwards, 463 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 5th Dist. 1985) (blood-alcohol test); Com. v. Billings, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 261, 
676 N.E.2d 62, 64 n.7 (1997) ("defendant's lifting his foot to show ... the bottom 
of his sneaker was nontestimonial' '). 
26 E.g., Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180, 1181 (1Oth Cir. 1998) (Oklahoma stat-
ute) ("We rejected the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because DNA 
samples are not testimonial in nature."); Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, 1 & I, 103 F.3d 
940 (lOth Cir. 1996) (Kansas statute); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (lOth 
Cir. 1996) (Colorado statute). 
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A. Seizing Biological Evidence From a Person 
In United States v. Dionisio, 27 after ruling that the compelled appearance 
of a person before a grand jury was not a "seizure" within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court considered whether the taking of 
a voice exemplar constituted a search. The Court wrote: 
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as 
opposed to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed 
to the public. Like a man's facial characteristics, or handwriting, his voice 
is repeatedly produced for others to hear. No person can have a reason-
able expectation that others will not know the sound of his voice, any 
more than he can reasonably expect that his face will be a mystery to the 
world. 
Accordingly, there was no search. In United States v. Mara, 28 the Court 
reached the same conclusion with respect to handwriting: ''Handwriting, 
like speech, is repeatedly shown to the public, and there is no more expecta-
tion of privacy in the physical characteristics of a person's script than there 
is in the tone of his voice." 
All evidence of physical characteristics, however, is not beyond Fourth 
Amendment protection. In Schmerber, which was decided before Dionisio, 
the Court had held that the extraction of blood for the pw-pose of scientific 
analysis "plainly constitutes searches of the 'persons' " 29 within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. In Dionisio, the Court distinguished, rather 
than overruled, Schmerber: "The required disclosw-e of a person's voice is 
thus immeasw-ably further removed from the Fourth Amendment protection 
than was the intrusion into the body effected by the blood extraction in 
Schmerber. ''30 Hence, the difference between Dionsio and Schmerber turns 
on the bodily intrusion involved in the extraction of blood samples. In Sldn-
ner v. Railway Labor Executives ' Association, 31 the Court once again noted 
that ''it is obvious that this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, 
27 U.S. v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14, 93 S. Ct. 764, 35 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1973). 
28 U.S. v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21, 93 S. Ct. 774, 35 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1973). Accord 
U.S. v. Euge, 1980-1 C.B. 310,444 U.S. 707,718, 100 S. Ct. 874,63 L. Ed. 2d 141, 
80-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 9222, 45 A.F.T.R.2d 80-757 (1980) ("Compulsion of 
handwriting exemplars is neither a search or seizure subject to Fourth Amendment 
protections .... "). See also Burns v. State, 729 So. 2d 203, 216 (Miss. 1998) 
("[W]hen there is no expectation of privacy concern, using trickery as a method for 
obtaining handwriting exemplars is at worst bad practice.''). 
29 384 U.S. at 767. 
30 Schmerber, 410 U.S. at 14. 
31 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616, 109 S. Ct. 
1402, 103 L. Ed. 2d 639, 4 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 224, 130 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2857, 13 
O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2065, 49 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 38791, 1 1 1 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 
P 11001, 1989 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) P 28476 (1989). 
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infringes an expectation of p1ivacy that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable.' ' 32 
The collection of saliva by means of buccal swabs is another cOiwuon 
method of collecting DNA samples. Although not as invasive as the extrac-
tion of blood, the comis have generally characterized the taking of saliva 
samples as a search under the Fourth Amendment.33 
l8. Senznll'ilg §ijj]spec~s ~o Olb~anll'il f8no~ognca~ Samp~es 
Before biological samples, either blood or saliva, can be obtained, the 
donor must come under the control of the police. This can be accomplished 
by several different methods: (1) consent, 3·1 (2) search warrant/5 (3) grand 
32 ln addition, an ensuing chemical analysis of the blood sample to obtain physi-
ological data "is a further invasion" of privacy interests-infom1ational privacy. 
489 U.S. at 616-17. The Court in S/d;mer also considered the collection of urine 
samples. Even though this procedure does not involve a bodily intrusion, the Court 
held that it was a search. Like blood, the chemical analysis of urine can "reveal a 
host of p1ivate medical facts," including whether a person is epileptic, pregnant, or 
diabetic. See also Burnett v. Municipality of Anchorage, 806 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th 
Cir. l 986) (" [T]he administration of a breath test is a search within the meaning of 
the Fourth An1endment .... "). 
~3 In U.S. v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 55 (E.D. N.Y. 1995) (rejected by, In re 
Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 171 Vt. 227, 762 A.2d 1239 
(2000)), the court wrote: 
A saliva sample can provide a significant amount of genetic identity information 
and it is generally not an item in the public domain. Yet, expectorating is not 
viewed with the same disfavor nor concealed behind closed doors as urinating; 
consider the cominonplace sight of athletes expectorating on national television 
on a daily basis . . .. 
It is typically the case that a saliva sample is obtained by swabbing the inside of 
the subject's mouth with a pad of some sort. Such a scenario, wherein a citizen 
is directed to subm..it to an intrusion into his body, is properly viewed as implicat-
ing his dignitary interests. This factor, combined with the private identifying in-
formation contained in the sample suggests that a proper compliance with the 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is mandated. 
See also In re Shabazz, 200 F. Supp. 2d 578, 582 (D.S.C. 2002) ("[A] grand jury 
subpoena duces tecum requiring Petitioner to submit a saliva sample for the purpose 
of DNA testing invades a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' and is therefore a 
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 (D.N.H. 1998) ("A grand jury 
subpoena compelling a citizen to provide saliva samples does implicate his or her 
Fourth An1endment rights."); Com. v. Blasioli, 454 Pa. Super. 207, 685 A.2d 151, 
156 (1996), aff'd, 552 Pa. 149,713 A.2d 1117 (1998). 
3
'l If a suspect consents, neither a warrant nor probable cause is required. See 
Brent v. White, 398 F.2d 503, 505 (5th Cir. 1968) (consent to blood extraction); 
United States ex ref. U.S. ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1088 (D. 
Del. 1972), order aff'd, 481 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1973). 
35 The emergency exception recognized in Sclzmerber for intoxication testing 
would not apply in this context. When blood is sought for the purpose of genetic 
testing (including DNA profiling), the physical characteristic remains constant. See-
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jury subpoena,36 and (4) nontestimonial identification order. The remainder 
of this article focuses on the latter method. Unlike a search warrant (which 
requires probable cause), a nontestimonial identification order typically 
requires only reasonable suspicion, a lesser standard. 
1. Davis v. Mississippi 
In Terry v. Ohio,37 the Supreme CoUrt first recognized that the detention 
of a suspect on less than probable cause may satisfy the Fourth Amendment's 
"reasonableness" requirement. The importance of Terry and its progeny, 
defining the scope of the "stop and frisk" doctrine, to the collection of phys-
ical evidence for the purpose of scientific analysis turns on dictum in Davis 
v. Mississippi. 38 The Court in Davis held that the detention of numerous 
suspects, during which fingerprints were obtained, on less than probable 
cause was unconstitutional. However, Justice Brennan commented: 
Detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less 
subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. It is arguable, 
however, that, because of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process, 
such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances, be found 
to comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable 
cause in the traditional sense .... Detention for fingerprinting may con-
stitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other 
types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of 
the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an 
interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed 
repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of 
each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more 
reliable and effective crime solving tool than eyewitness identifications or 
confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper lineup and 
the "third degree." Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of 
fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an 
inconvenient time. For this same reason, the general requirement that the 
authorization of a judicial officer be obtained in advance of detention 
would seem not to admit of any exception in the fingerprinting context. 
He then added: "We have no occasion in this case, however, to determine 
whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by nar-
Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Tex. 1969), judgment aff'd, 424 F.2d 
524 (5th Cir. 1970); Mills v. Stat_e, 28 Md. App. 300, 345 A.2d 127, 132 (1975), 
judgment aff'd, 278 Md. 262, 363 A.2d 491 (1976). See also Barlow v. Ground, 943 
F.2d 1132, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1991) (warrantless blood extraction to test for AIDS-
causing HIV virus unconstitutional); State v. Gammill, 2 Kan. App. 2d 627, 585 
P.2d 1074, 1077 (1978) (hair follicle, no emergency as in Schmerber); State v. 
Jones, 111 Nev. 774, 895 P.2d 643 (1995) (warrantless extraction ofblood to test for 
cocaine violates Fourth Amendment due to lack of exigent circumstances as in 
Schmerber; cocaine and its metabolites remain in the user's blood for six to fourteen 
hours after ingestion). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
37 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 
38 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727-28, 89 S. Ct. 1394, 22 L. Ed. 2d 676 
(1969). 
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rmvly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a crimi-
nal investigation, the fingerpri_nts of i.ndividuals for whom there is no prob-
able cause to anest . . .. " 39 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to directly address the issue, in 
Hayes v. Florida;lo it wrote that it had "not abandon[ ed] the suggestion in 
Davis ... that under circumscribed procedures, the Fourth Amendment 
might pennit the judiciary to authorize the seizure of a person on less than 
probable cause and his removal to the police station for the purpose of 
fingerprinting.'' The Court also noted that the state courts were divided on 
this issue. For example, some had sanctioned the use ofNTOs,·H while oth-
ers had refused to uphold the issuance of such orders.42 None of these cases, 
however, involved a "narrowly circumscribed" nontestimonial-order stat-
ute, which raises a different issue than whether a court has inherent authority 
to issue such an order. 
In 2003, the Court once again noted the issue in passi.t1g: ''We have . . . 
left open the possibility that, 'tmder circ11mscribed procedures,' a court might 
validly authorize a seizure on less than probable cause when the object is 
fingerprinting.' '43 
The dicta in the Supreme Court cases focused on fingerprinting, which 
the Court emphasized was not an intrusive procedure. The issuance of a non-
testimonial identification order for more intmsive procedures, such as the 
extraction of blood, may conflict with Sclzmerber, in which the Comi 
required a more demanding standard when blood is obtained. In contrast, 
buccal swaps, although protected by the Fourth Amendment,·!~ do not involve 
the penetration of the skin, and thus may be subject to less stringent require-
ments than blood. 
The invitation contained in the Davis dictum did not go unanswered for 
39 394 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added) . 
• Jo Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1985) . 
. j] See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A.2d 205, 213-16 (D.C. 1971) (en bane) (iineups); 
State v. Hall, 93 N.J. 552, 461 A.2d 1155, 1160 (1983) (lineup); In re Fingerprinting 
ofM. B., 125 N.J. Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3, 6 (App. Div. 1973) (fingerprints). 
42 See U.S. v. Jennings, 468 F.2d 111, 115 (9th Cir. 1972) (fingerprints); In re 
September 198 I Term Grand Jury, I 04 Ill. App. 3d 94, 59 Ill. Dec. 839, 432 N.E.2d 
625, 630 (4th Dist. 1982) (probable cause required for blood and hair samples); 
People v. Marshall, 69 Mich. App. 288,244 N.W.2d 451,457 (1976) (detention or-
der for hair and blood samples must be based on probable cause); State v. Evans, 
215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1983) (probable cause required for fingerprints 
and palmprints); Matter of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 437 N.E.2d 
265, 266 (1982) (probable cause required for blood sample); In re .Armed Robbery, 
Albertson's, on August 31, 1981, 99 Wash. 2d 106, 659 P.2d 1092, 1096 (1983) 
(lineup). 
·
13 Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 n.2, 123 S. Ct. 1843, 155 L. Ed. 2d 814 
(2003) (quoting Hayes). 
41 See supra note 33. 
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long. Based on that dictum, a number of states adopted (by statute or court 
rule) provisions authorizing detentions for the purpose of non testimonial 
identification procedures: Alaska,45 Arizona/6 Colorado,47 Idaho,48 Iowa,49 
Nebraska, 50 North Carolina,51 Utah, 52 and Vermont. 53 
The Arizona statute, for example, provides for the issuance of judicial 
orders for obtaining ''fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, 
handwriting, handprinting, sound of voice, blood samples, urine samples, 
saliva samples, hair samples, comparative personal appearance, or photo-
graphs of an individual.' ' 54 Such an order may be issued if the following 
conditions are satisfied: 
1. Reasonable cause for belief that a specifically described criminal offense 
punishable by at least one year in the state prison has been committed. 
2. Procurement of evidence of identifying physical characteristics from an 
identified or particularly described individual may contribute to the 
identification of the individual who committed such offense. 
3. Such evidence cannot otherwise be obtained by the investigating officer 
from either the law enforcement agency employing the affiant or the 
criminal identification division of the Arizona department of public 
safety.55 
Unlike other provisions, the Arizona statute does not specify the quantum of 
evidence required to subject a person to such an order. The ''reasonable 
cause" provision in that statute relates to the crime, not the suspect. In 
contrast, an Idaho statute provides that a nontestimonial identification order 
may be issued if"[r]easonable grounds exist, which may or may not amount 
to probable cause, to believe that the . . . individual committed the criminal 
offense. " 56 In other words, the "reasonable suspicion" test of Teny v. Ohio. 
45 ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 16(c)(2) (discovery rule). 
46 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (2001). 
47 CoLO. R. CRIM. P. 41.1. See also CoLo. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(c)(2) ("reasonable 
grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person . . . 
committed the offense"). 
48 IDAHO CODE § 19-625 (2005). See also IDAHO CODE § 19-625(B) (2004) 
("[r]easonable grounds exist, which may or may not amount to probable cause, to 
believe that the ... individual committed the criminal offense"). 
49 IOWA CODE ANN.§ 810.1-.2 (West2003). 
50 NEB. REv. STAT.§ 29-3301 to 3307 (1995) (requires probable cause). 
51 N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-271 to -282 (2005). See also N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-
273(2) (2005) ("reasonable grounds to suspect"). 
52 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 to -4 (2003) (lineups only). See also UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-8-1(1) (2003) ("reason to believe"). 
53 VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1. See also VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1(c)(2) ("reasonable grounds 
. . to suspect"). 
54 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3905(G) (2001). 
55 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-3905(A) (2001). 
56 IDAHO CODE§ 19-625(B) (2005). See also CoLO. R. CRIM. P. 4l.l(c)(2) ("rea-
sonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person 
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The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws"7 and the American Law 
Lnstitute (ALI)58 promulgated comparable provisions. The AU cmmnentary 
sets forth the following rationale: 
A strict adherence to the standard of probable cause for detentions to 
conduct identification procedures not only hinders the police in their ef-
forts to gather evidence, but also encourages them to use arrests in cases 
where there may not be reasonable [probable] cause. In many cases the 
police have sufficient evidence to justify a lawful arrest, yet further 
investigation is called for before a decision to institute criminal proceed-
ings is warranted. Since, under generally prevailing law, sufficient grounds 
to anest are required to obtain identification evidence, the police may ar-
rest before conducting such procedures and then determine whether to 
charge the suspect with the crime. If, as a result of the evidence obtained 
from such post-arrest procedures, the suspect is found to be innocent of 
the crime under investigation and released without further judicial 
proceedings, he still has an arrest on his record. 59 
A federalmle was proposed in 1971 60 but never adopted-apparently 
because its constitutionality was suspect: A Judicial Conference report com-
mented that ''the committees believes that before a procedural rule on this 
subject is recommended to the Supreme Court, the committee and the 
Conference should have the benefit of more experience with such procedure 
in the states and in the District of Columbia and of judicial consideration of 
the Constitutional questions involved.' ' 61 
ABA Discovery Standard 3.1 is sometimes cited as also providing for 
nontestimonial orders, but the issue appears more complex. 62 This Standard 
is a discovery provision, not an investigatory mle, as are most of the state 
... committed the offense"); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 15A-273(2) ("reasonable grounds 
to suspect"); UTAH CoDE ANN.§ 77-8-1(1) ("reason to believe"); VT. R. CRJM. P. 
4I.l(c)(2) ("reasonable grounds ... to suspect"). The Nebraska statute has been 
construed to require probable cause. State v. Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788, 
793 (1983). 
57 UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 436 (1987). 
58 MoDEL CODE OF PRE-ARFJ,IGN!Vf..ENT P. art. 170 (Official Draft 1975) (herein-
after l\i10DEL CODE). 
59 MoDEL CoDE, supra note 58, cmt. at 462. 
6° FED. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 (Proposed Draft), 52 F.R.D. 462 (1971). 
61 U.S. v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 674 (5th Cir. !977), opinion withdrawn, 565 
F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1978). 
62 The provision reads: 
(A) Upon motion by either party, if the court finds that there is good cause to 
believe that the evidence sought may be material to the determination of the is-
sues in the case, the court should, in advance of trial, issue compulsory process 
for the following purposes: 
... (ii) To obtain from a third party fingerprints, photographs, handwriting 
exemplars, or voice exemplars, or to compel a third party to appear, move or 
speak for identification in a lineup, to try on clothing or other articles, to permit 
the taking of specimens of blood, urine, saliva, breath, hair, nails, or other 
materials of the body, to submit to a reasonable physical or medical inspection 
of the body, or to participate in other reasonable and appropriate procedures. 
Such process should be issued if the court finds that: (1) the procedure is reason-
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provisions. By the time discovery rules apply, the suspect has been charged 
by indictment or information. Nevertheless, Standard 3.1 permits a prosecu-
tor or defendant to obtain blood and saliva samples from third parties. It 
specifies a "reasonableness" standard. The Commentary states: "To grant 
such a request, the court must first find that the proposed procedure is rea-
sonable and will not involve an undue intrusion of the body or affront to the 
person's dignity. For example, requiring persons to provide fingerprints, 
photos, handwriting or voice exemplars, or other evidence of outward ap-
pearance are procedures which are held to be reasonable and non-intrusive. 
Other procedures may involve greater intrusions, but may nonetheless be 
considered reasonable if the evidence sought is highly material.'' Here, the 
Commentary cites Winston v. Lee, 63 noting that '' [a] finding of 'reasonable-
ness' for such bodily searches may be required by the Fourth Amendment." 
Winston involved the surgical removal of a bullet from a suspect for the 
purpose of firearms (ballistics) identification. According to the Court: 
The reasonableness of surgical intrusions beneath the skin depends on a 
case-by-case approach, in which the individual's interests in privacy and 
security are weighed against society's interests in conducting the 
procedure. In a given case, the question whether the community's need 
for evidence outweighs the substantial privacy interests at stake is a deli-
cate one admitting of few categorical answers. 64 
A number of Jaw review coro..mentaries-often written by students65 
able and will be conducted in a manner which does not involve an unreasonable 
intrusion of the body or an unreasonable alfront to the dignity of the individual; 
and (2) the request is reasonable. 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 57 (3d ed. 
1996). 
63 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985). 
64 470 U.S. at 760. The Court relied principally on two factors to determine that 
surgery would be unconstitutional in Winston. First, the Court referred to the risk to 
the defendant's health as a "crucial factor." For example, "a search for evidence of 
a crime may be unjustifiable if it endangers the life or health of the suspect.'' The 
Court later noted that the record showed uncertainty about the medical risks 
involved. Second, the Court found that the prosecution's need for the evidence was 
not compelling. There was substantial additional evidence that could be introduced 
to establish the defendant's guilt; the victim had made a positive and spontaneous 
identification of the accused, and the accused had been found near the scene of the 
crime, with a bullet wound, soon after its commission. 
65 See Comment, Detention for Taking Physical Evidence Without Probable 
Cause, 14 ARiz. L. REv. 132 (1972); Comment, People v. Harris, Rule 41.1, and the 
Constitutionality of Investigatory Detentions on Less Than Probable Cause, 61 U. 
CoLO. L. REv. 815 (1990); Note, Detention to Obtain Physical Evidence Without 
Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
72 CoLUM. L. REv. 712 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionality of Compulsory 
Identification Procedures on Less Than Probable Cause: Reassessing the Davis 
Dictum, 89 DICK. L. REv. 501 (1985); Note, Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41.1, 56 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1972); Comment, Criminal Law and Proce-
dure Nontestimonial Identification Orders Without Probable Cause, 12 WAKE FoR-
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-addressed the subject at the time the nontestimonial procedure provisions 
were first adopted. In addition, several scholars have looked at the issue, 
generally approving such procedures. 66 One leading Fourth Amendment 
expert, Professor LaFave, has written: "As a general proposition, it may be 
said that the procedures contemplated by the Davis-Hayes dictum do not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. " 67 Similarly, the AU drafters concluded 
that ''it appears likely that the inclusion of such orders would be upheld.' ' 68 
The issue resurfaced decades later with the advent of DNA evidence.69 
Several constitutional challenges to nontestimonial orders provisions 
have been made. Many of the early cases did not involve blood or saliva 
samples. For example, in upholding the constitutionality of the state statute, 
the Arizona Supreme Court wrote: 
The degree of intrusion into the per·son's privacy is relatively slight. 
Photographs, more so than fingerprints, involve none of the probing that 
the Davis court found to mark a search of an unreasonable nature. 
Similarly, clipping several head hairs is only the slightest intrusion upon 
the body, if any at all, and does not constitute anything unreasonable.70 
The Colorado Supreme Court also upheld its rule in a case invoiving 
handw1iting exemplars: 
These cases suggest that limited intrusions into privacy on less than prob-
able cause are reconcilable with Fourth Amendment guarantees when the 
following conditions exist. First, there must be an articulable and specific 
basis in fact for suspecting criminal activity at the outset. Second, the 
intrusion must be limited in scope, purpose and duration. Third, the 
intrusion must be justified by substantial law enforcement interests. Last, 
there must be an opportunity at some point to subject the intrusion to the 
neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer before the evidence 
EST L. REv. 387 (1976); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Taking of Body Ev-
idence, 78 YALE L.J. 1074 (1969). 
66 See George E. Dix, Nonarrest Invesiigatmy Detentions in Search and Seizure 
Law, 1985 DuKE L.J. 849, 91 5-16; Jerold H. Israel, Legislative Regulation of 
Searches and Seizures, 73 MICH. L. REv. 222, 238-41, 310-14 (1974); H. Richard 
Uviller, The Acquisition of Evidence for Criminal Prosecution: Some Constitutional 
Premises and Practices in Transition, 35 VAND. L. REV. 501, 524-25 (1982). 
67 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE§ 9.8(b), at 723 (4th ed. 2004). 
68 MoDEL CODE, supra note 58, cmt. at 483. 
69 The DNA articles include: Angus J. Dodson, Comment, DNA ''Line- Ups'' 
Based on a Reasonable Suspicion Standard, 71 U. CoLo. L. REv. 221,253-54 (2000) 
(arguing that DNA sampling and profiling are "closely analogous to fingerprinting" 
and should be permitted under Davis standard); Clare M. Tande, Note, DNA Typing: 
A New lnvestigatOI)l Tool, 1989 DuKE L.J. 474. 
70 State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, 536 (1975) (en bane) (photo-
graphs, fingerprints and hair samples). See also State v. Via, 146 Ariz. 108, 704 P.2d 
238 (1985); Long v. Ganett, 22 Ariz. App. 397, 527 P.2d 1240 (Div. 2 1974) 
(handwriting exemplar). 
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obtained therefrom may be admitted in a criminal proceeding against the 
accused.71 
In contrast, the Nebraska Supreme Court construed its statute to require 
probable cause in order to avoid any constitutional issues, 72 believing that 
later cases "effectively dispel any speculation created by the [Davis] 
dictum." 
The more recent cases involve DNA analysis. In In re Non-Testimonial 
Identification Order Directed to R.H,73 the Vermont Supreme Court upheld 
a nontestimonial order that required saliva samples from a murder suspect, 
ruling that the state statute requiring only reasonable suspicion was 
constitutional. There was no direct evidence linking the suspect with the 
nine-year-old murder. Nevertheless, he lived in the area and had a long his-
tory of sexual assaults on women, including in one instance a comparable 
method of attack as in the murder case. The court wrote: 
We recognize that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have 
involved the narrow question of obtaining fingerprints. We conclude that 
the basic elements of saliva sampling for DNA are similar to the 
characteristics of fingerprinting as described in Davis. Like fingerprinting, 
saliva sampling involves no intrusion into a person's life or thoughts; it 
can not be used repeatedly to harass; it is not subject to abuses like the 
improper line-up or the third degree. DNA comparison "is an inherently 
more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifica-
tions or confessions." (quoting Davis). 
In Bousman v. Iowa District Court,74 the Iowa Supreme Court wrote: 
"A nontestimonial identification order issued [for oral swabs] pursuant to 
chapter 810 must be constitutionally reasonable. This requirement means 
that the order must be supported by reasonable grounds to suspect that the 
subject of the order committed the crime under investigation. Probable cause 
to believe that the subject of the order actually committed the crime is not 
necessary.'' 
Although there is no federal statute, one federal case may deserve 
attention. In United States v. Ingram, 75 a prosecutor requested a court order 
to compel the defendant, who had been released on bail, to provide hair 
samples. The court ruled that such an order implicated the Fourth Amend-
71 People v. Madson, 638 P.2d 18,31-32 (Colo. 1981) (en bane). See also People 
v. Davis, 669 P.2d 130, 133-35 (Colo. 1983) (nontestimonial order for photographs, 
fingerprints, and voice exemplar based on informant's tip upheld); People v. Harris, 
729 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986),judgment aff'd, 762 P.2d 651 (Colo. 
1988). 
72 State v. Evans, 215 Neb. 433, 338 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1983) (probable cause 
required for fingerprints and palmprints ). 
73 In re Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 17 I Vt. 227, 762 
A.2d 1239, 1247 (2000). 
74 Bousman v. Iowa Dist. Court for Clinton County, 630 N.W.2d 789, 801 (Iowa 
2001). The order in the case, however, was deficient because it did not contain 
required information about the unnamed informant. 
75 U.S. v. Ingram, 797 F. Supp. 705, 717 (E.D. Ark. 1992). 
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ment in two respects-the compulsion of the defendant to appear and the 
seizure of the hair. Both intrusions had to be justified by reasonable suspicion 
(not probable cause): The prosecution "will only need to show a reasonable 
suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts and the inferences 
rationally drawn from those facts, that (1) Mr. Ingram has committed a crime, 
and (2) that the taking of hair samples will provide evidence connecting him 
to the crime that he allegedly committed.'' In addition, a neutral judicial of-
ficer would determine whether this standard had been satisfied: ''The require-
ment of prior judicial approval will best safeguard the individual's privacy 
interests without placing a significant burden on prosecutors or the court 
system.'' 
Consideration of other methods to obtain biological samples may 
provide some helpful background in this context. in several cases, prosecu-
tors have sought grand subpoenas. In i·e Grand Jwy Proceedings re Vick-
ers76 involved a request for fi__ngerprints, hair, and saliva. The district court 
found that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated i1i the request for 
fingerprints and hair. The saliva sample, in the court's view, was different 
" [A] grand jury subpoena compelling a citizen to provide saliva samples 
does implicate his or her Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to balang~e the grand jury's legitimate interest in conducting a thorough 
investigation and obtaining relevant evidence against respondents' constitu-
tionally protected interests, to detennine whether what is effectively a search 
and seizure is, nevertheless, reasonable. " 77 In upholding the order, the court 
went on to elaborate: "[D]uring its inqui1y into the 'reasonableness' of the 
challenged subpoena, the court will balance the legitimate and protected 
privacy interests of those subpoenaed against the grand jury's legitimate 
need to conduct its investigation and obtain evidence relevant to its inquiry 
into possible criminal wrongdoing.' ' 78 
In In re Shabazz,79 another district court wrote: "[A]lthough a showing 
of probable cause is not necessary, the grand jmy subpoena duces tecum 
requi1ing a saliva swab must be based on reasonable individualized suspicion 
that Petitioner was engaged in criminal wrongdoing.'' 
The recent ABA Standards on DNA Evidence approve of nontestimo-
76 In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Vickers, 38 F. Supp. 2d 159, 165 
(D.N.H. 1998) ("[T]he grand jury's request for hair samples, like fingerprints, does 
not implicate respondents' Fourth Amendment rights."). 
77 38 F. Supp. 2d at 165-66. 
78 38 F. Supp. 2d at 167 (quoting Winston, 470 U.S. at 760 ("The reasonableness 
of . . . intrusions beneath the skin depends on a case-by-case approach, in which 
the individual's interests in privacy and security are weighed against society's 
interests in conducting the procedure.")). 
79 ln re Shabazz, 200 F. Supp. 2d 578, 584-85 (D.S.C. 2002). 
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' 
nial identification procedures. Under Standard 2.2, DNA may be collected 
from a suspect in a non-invasive manner (e.g., saliva samples) if there is 
"reasonable suspicion" that the suspect committed the crime, and in an 
invasive manner (e.g., blood samples) if there is "probable cause" that the 
suspect did so.80 In either instance there must be probable cause that a seri-
ous crime has been committed.81 
The judicial-order approach was considered superior to alternative 
procedures, such as dragnets82 and the surreptitious collection of so-called 
"abandoned" DNA,83 because the decision whether to issue the order is 
made on notice (absent exigent circumstances84 ), on the record, in open 
80 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusTICE, DNA EviDENCE, Standard 2.2 
(2007) (hereinafter ABA STANDARDs-DNA EviDENCE). The author was the 
Reporter for the DNA Standards. 
81 In contrast, a search warrant directing the collection of a DNA sample must be 
issued based upon a showing of probable cause both (I) that a crime was committed 
and (2) that the suspect committed it, regardless of the intrusiveness of the means by 
which the sample is obtained. 
82 See Pam Belluck, To Try to Net Killer, Police Ask A Small Town's Men for 
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at AI ("Raising concerns among civil libertarians 
and prompting resistance from some men in Truro, the state and local police began 
collecting the generic samples last week, visiting delicatessens, the post office and 
even the town dump to politely ask men to cooperate.''). The killer was later ar-
rested but not as a result of the dragnet. As a trash collector, his DNA had been 
taken earlier but was not analyzed for several months, during which time the dragnet 
occurred. 
See Roberto Iraola, DNA Dragnets-A Constitutional Catch?, 54 DRAKE L. REv. 
15 (2005). Iraola reports that eighteen such "dragnets" or "sweeps" have been 
conducted thus far in the United States since 1990, id. at 18, and that the first re-
corded DNA dragnet occurred in 1986 in Narborough, England, where the targeted 
pool comprised of 4,500 men in the area surrounding the village where the crimes 
under investigation occurred. ''The practice then moved to other parts of Europe, 
with the largest mass sweep taking place in 1998 when samples were taken from 
16,400 persons in Struecklingen, Germany, in connection with the murder and rape 
of an eleven-year-old girl." !d. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted). 
See also Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free 
Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconstitutionality of DNA Drag-
nets, 89 MINN. L. REv. 1842 (2005); Fred. W. Drobner, Comment, DNA Dragnets: 
Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification Testing, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 479 
(2000); Jeffrey S. Grand, Note, The Blooding of America: Privacy and the DNA 
Dragnet, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 2277 (2002) (citing cases of 600 and 800 person 
dragnets); Laurie Stroum Yeshulas, Note, DNA Dragnet Practices: Are They Consti-
tutional?, 8 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. Aovoc. 133 (2003). 
83 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming 'Abandoned' DNA: The Fourth Amendment 
and Genetic Privacy, 100 Nw. L. REv. 857 (2006); Amy Harmon, Lawyers Fight 
Gene Material Gained on Sly, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at AI. 
84 Examples of exigent circumstances that would excuse the notice requirement 
include situations where there is a risk of flight or where a child is missing. Cf Cupp 
v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296, 93 S. Ct. 2000, 36 L. Ed. 2d 900 (1973) (circum-
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court, and by a neutral and detached magistrate. Cmmsel is provided as an-
other safeguard, both to explain the proceedings to the person subject to the 
order and to assert that person's rights.85 
The issuance of a judicial order on notice and after a hearing is also 
superior to the ususal ex parte procedure applicable to the issuance of a 
search warrant. With NTOs, an ex parte procedure is generally not required 
because genetic markers, unlike blood-alcohol content, remain constant.86 
The ABA Standards also address another tmresolved issue. Standard 2.2 
permits collecting biological samples from non-suspects.87 In rape cases, 
biological evidence typically involves a mixture of semen and epithelial 
vaginal cells. Consequently, elimination samples from the victim are 
required. Similarly, elimination samples from the victim's husband or other 
consensual sexual partners may be needed. Typically, elimination samples 
are provided voluntarily. Sometimes they are not. 
The Standard would permit the issuance of a court order to a non-suspect 
ifthere is probable cause that a serious crime has been committed, and "a 
sample is necessary to establish or eliminate that person as a contributor to 
or source of the DNA evidence or otherwise establishes the profile of a 
person who may have committed the crime.' ' 88 
The requirements of Standards 2.2(c) and 2.2(d) are somewhat anoma-
lous: non~suspects have the same Fourth Amendments rights as suspects but 
stances "justified the police in subjecting him to the very limited search necessary 
to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they fmmd under his fingernails"). 
85 The constitutional right to counsel may not have attached atthis point. See 
Fellers v. U.S., 540 U.S. 519, 523, 124 S. Ct. 1019, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (2004); 
K.irby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411 (1972) (right 
to counsel attaches only after the "initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceed-
ings-whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, informa-
tion, or arraignment"). 
86 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 
(1966) (because the alcohol content of blood diminishes with the passage of time, 
the Court recognized an "emergency" exception to the warrant requirement, which 
was necessary to preclude the destmction of evidence). 
87 In In re Jansen, 444 Mass. 112, 826 N.E.2d 186 (2005) (abrogated by, Com. v. 
Dwyer, 448 Mass. 122, 859 N.E.2d 400 (2006)), the court held that a trial judge was 
authorized to issue a subpoena for a buccal swab of a third party. The indicted de-
fendant claimed that Jansen, not he, was the rapist. A defense investigator secured 
bottles from Jansen's trash and had them tested; the DNA matched the crime scene 
evidence. The court found that the proposed test had "significant relevance and evi-
dentiary value" of an exculpatory nature. Interestingly, the court found that the 
Fourth Amendment was not implicated because the search was "private." 
88 ABA STANDARDs-DNA EviDENCE, supra note 80, Standard 2.2(b)(ii). This 
Standard could be met, for example, if the DNA evidence collected at a crime scene 
appeared to include DNA contributed by more than one person, and determining the 
DNA profile of a non-suspect (perhaps the victim of the crime, or, in the case of a 
rape, a person who recently had consensual sex with the victim) would assist in 
detennining which alleles in the DNA profile developed from the crime scene evi-
dence had been contributed by the perpetrator of the crime. 
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reasonable suspicion is not required for non-suspects, since there can be, by 
definition, no reason to suspect such a person. Instead, the standard requires 
"necessity" for the sample.89 Courts have ordered blood tests to resolve 
civil paternity actions, 90 a somewhat similar situation. 91 In Commonwealth v. 
Draheim, 92 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that the pros-
ecution could obtain buccal samples from two children in a rape case: 
"[W]here the third parties are not suspects, in order to respect the third par-
ties' constitutional rights, the Commonwealth must show probable cause to 
believe a crime was committed, and that the sample will probably provide 
evidence relevant to the question of the defendant's guilt . . .. Additional 
factors concerning the seriousness of the crime, the importance of the evi-
dence, and the unavailability of less intrusive means of obtaining it are 
germane.' ' 93 
CONCLUSION 
In the Duke case, there was no question that the state lacked probable 
cause to require forty-six players to provide buccal samples for DNA 
analysis. Whether there was reasonable suspicion is an interesting issue. Un-
like the N.C. provision, statutes in other states pennit use of a NTO only if 
the evidence cannot be "otherwise" obtained,94 a requirement consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness prescription. For example, in 
the absence of a flight risk, the police should first seek to obtain the samples 
89 See IND. ConE ANN.§ 35-38-7-15 (West 2002) (allowing the collection of 
elimination samples from third parties under "extraordinary circumstances"). 
90 See Doe v. Senechal, 431 Mass. 78, 725 N.E.2d 225 (2000) (holding patient 
made necessary showing that staff person's paternity was "in controversy," and 
made the requisite showing of'' good cause,'' and buccal swab paternity test met the 
Fourth Amendment's standard of reasonableness). 
91 See Margaret A. Berger, Lessons fi·om DNA: Restriking the Balance between 
Finality and Justice, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JusTICE SYSTEM 110, 117 (David 
Lazer ed., 2004) ("As yet there is virtually no law on obtaining elimination samples 
from third persons, or on the consequences of such a sample's not being available.''); 
Cynthia Bryant, When One Man's DNA Is Another's Exonerating Evidence: Com-
pelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Samples to 
Post-Conviction Petitioners, 33 CoLUM. J. L & Soc. PoL'Y 113 (2000). 
92 Com. v. Draheim, 447 Mass. 113, 849 N.E.2d 823 (2006). See also State v. 
Register, 308 S.C. 534, 419 S.E.2d 771 (1992) (holding State could compel blood, 
hair, and saliva samples from third-party non-suspect where state showed probable 
cause crime committed by particular suspect and "a clear indication that material 
evidence relevant to the question of the suspect's guilt will be found"). 
93 849 N.E.2d at 829 (citing Matter ofLavigne, 418 Mass. 831, 641 N.E.2d 1328 
(1994)). 
94 E.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905(A) {2006). On the other hand, the 
North Carolina statute contains discovery and right-to-counsel provisions that are 
absent from many of the other NTO statutes. 
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by consent. Moreover, in the Dulce case, "[s]ome players could prove they 
had been nowhere near the party that night.' ' 95 
Despite the deficiencies in the Dulce case, nontestimonial identification 
orders based on reasonable suspicion-properly applied-have merit. Such 
orders satisfy the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements if they 
are based on a carefully drawn statute or mle that provides ce1iain safeguards. 
Unlike an ex parte application for a search warrant, NTO procedures should 
involve a hearing in which counsel is provided and a judicial finding that no 
reasonable alternative means of obtaining the evidence are available. More-
over, if blood samples are ordered, they should be taken by medical 
personneP6 Finally, the suspect should have a right to receive the test results. 
95 TAYLOR & JoHNSON, supra note 1, at 57. 
96 In Schmerber, the Court held that the scientific procedure chosen as well as the 
manner in which it is performed are both subject to the Fourth Amendment's 
reasonableness requirement. With respect to the procedure, the Court commented, 
"we are satisfied that the test chosen to measure petitioner's blood alcohol level was 
a reasonable one. Extraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means 
of determining the degree to which a person is under the influence of 
alcohol."Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 
908 (1966). The Court also found that the ''record shows that the test was performed 
in a reasonable manner. Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital 
environment according to accepted medical practices." !d. See also Winston v. Lee, 
470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985) (involving surgical re-
moval of a bullet from a suspect for the purpose of fireanns (ballistics) identification). 
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